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Abstract 
This chapter considers whether and how cognizance is given to the value of dignity in 
‘access to care’ litigation in the United Kingdom with particular reference to the case 
of McDonald v United Kingdom.  The approach taken by the Court in this case raises 
questions as to how ‘dignity’ ought to be understood in the assessment of the health 
and social care needs of individuals, particularly the elderly, in the context of finite 
resources.  It is questioned whether the concept of dignity within the case is 
compatible with the current understanding of dignity in health and law, and in 
particular within a right to health approach (as defined in Article 12 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). As stated in the 
first paragraph of General Comment 14 ‘[e]very human being is entitled to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health conducive to living a life in 
dignity.’  Dignity is not a right, rather it is a ‘normative value’ associated with human 
rights.  As such it is a standard which courts ought to refer to in assessing whether the 
state has acted proportionately in the lawful limitation of a right, even in the context 
of finite resources.   Given the criticism of the concept of dignity as being vague 
courts have been reluctant to focus on this value, except in ‘hard cases’.   However 
there is a developing body of evidence, particularly within the realm of health and 
social care which can provide guidance on the meaning of the concept in particular 
contexts.   
Introduction  
Rationing of health and social care within the Kingdom (UK) is an accepted reality 
today.1  As such a growing body of case law has developed giving clear guidance on 
the legal principles and rights that the UK Courts look to when questions of 
availability and access to health and social care are brought before them.2   The case 
of McDonald v UK3 however highlights how limited the approach to justiciability is 
within the courts, which further raises questions in the wider debate on rationing in 
the context of a growing elderly population and finite resources.4   While the courts, 
in the Mc Donald litigation, 5   were prepared to review the procedural aspects 
associated with the decision making on the care provided, they were reluctant to 
assess in substantive terms the impact of the decision on the individual.6  Although 
dignity was acknowledged as being relevant throughout the various stages of the 
litigation there was limited discussion of the concept. This chapter questions whether 
and how greater consideration could have been given to the concept of dignity as 
                                                        
1 The case of McDonald v United Kingdom  4241/12 (2014) 60 E.H.R.R. 1 itself is evidence of this;  
Also see   D Callahan ‘Must We Ration Health Care for the Elderly’ Journal of Law Medicine and 
Ethics (Spring 2012) 10 – 16 p 12 & 13   Callahan suggests that rationing in the NHS is no longer 
covert but is overt.  He highlights the use of tools such as Quality – Adjusted Life Years in decisions 
on which treatments to make available as an example of this.  
2C Newdick Who Should we Treat? Rights, Rationing, and Resources in the NHS. (2004)  2nd ed, 
Oxford University Press: Oxford  
3 McDonald v United Kingdom (2014)  op cit n 1  
4 For a discussion on the limitations in current approach to litigation on rights of access to health and 
social care see  B Clough  & M Brazier ‘Never too Old for Health and Human Rights’ Medical Law 
International (2014) 14(3):133 – 156; L Clements ‘Disability, Dignity and the Cri de Coeur’ European 
Human Rights Law Review (2011) (6) 675 -685; O’Cinneide C. ‘Legal Accountability and Social 
Justice’ in Bamforth N. & Leyland P (eds) Accountability in the Contemporary Constitution. (2013) 
Oxford: Oxford University Press: Oxford 385 – 410 
5  McDonald v United Kingdom (2014) op cit n 1;  R (On the Application of McDonald) v Royal 
Borough of Chelsea and Kensington [2011] UKSC 33; R (On the Application of McDonald) v Royal 
Borough of Chelsea and Kensington (2010) EWCA 1109; R (On the Application of McDonald) v Royal 
Borough of Chelsea and Kensington (2009) EWHC 1582 (admin).  
6 Ibid.  Clough & Brazier p141  
understood with reference to the disciplines of health and law,7 including Article 12 
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).   
In spite of the relationship between health and dignity being clearly acknowledged in 
the international right to health there is limited guidance on what dignity means 
within the jurisprudence on Article 12 ICESCR. 8   However empirical research on 
health and law has the potential to develop the concept as a standard in law. The 
concept has been increasingly referred to within professional guidance9  and empirical 
research10 and within a growing body of literature11 and case law.12  This is a body of 
evidence the courts could refer to in the context of access to health and social care 
litigation and which they can contribute to by embedding dignity as a value that ought 
to be considered in decision making on access to social and health care entitlements. 
 
 
 
                                                        
7 C Foster Human Dignity in Bioethics and Law (2011) Hart Publishing: Oxford Chapter 5 – 7. Foster 
highlights examples of primary research on health care (which focused on trying to understand the 
meaning of dignity and the factors which impacted it) and reviews of case law looking at how the 
courts have approached dignity.  
8 N. Jacobson N ‘Dignity and Health: A Review’ Social Science and Medicine (2007) (64) p 292. 
9 See for example the Values of the  NHS Constitution for England and Wales  (2001) accessed at 
http://www.nhs.uk/NHSEngland/thenhs/about/Pages/nhscoreprinciples.aspx (18/5/2015) which 
includes ‘respect and dignity’;  the Royal College of Nurses Dignity Campaign (2008) accessed at 
http://www.rcn.org.uk/development/practice/dignity/story_of_the_rcn_dignity_campaign (18/5/2015). 
10 See for example Cairns D, Williams V, Victor C, Richards S, Le May A, Martin W & Oliver D
 
‘The 
Meaning and Importance of Dignified Care: Findings From a Survey of Health and Social Care 
Professionals’ BMC Geriatrics (2013)13 (28) doi:10.1186/1471-2318-13-28.  
11 Jacobson op cit n 8; Foster op cit  n 7;  McCrudden C ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of 
Human Rights’ European Journal of International Law (2008)19(4) 655- 724; Moon G. ‘From Equal 
Treatment to Appropriate Treatment: What Lessons can Canadian Equality Law on Dignity and on 
Reasonable Accommodation Teach the United Kingdom?’ European Human Rights Law Review 
(2006) (6) 695 – 721; Moon G. and Allen R. ‘Dignity Discourse in Discrimination Law: a Better Route 
to Equality?’ European Human Rights Law Review (2006) (6) 610 – 642; O’ Connell R. ‘The Role of 
Dignity in Equality Law: Lessons from South Africa and Canada’ International Journal of 
Constitutional Law (2008) 6(2) 267 – 286. 
12 See for example McCrudden op cit n11 who reviews human rights treaty law and jurisprudence to 
question the understanding of dignity in the context of human rights law and O’Connell op cit n 11 
who examines the concept in the context of equality law. 
 The McDonald Litigation.  
McDonald v United Kingdom involved a challenge13 against the decision (and care 
plan) made by a local borough council under their statutory duties.14 The local council 
had a duty to assess the client’s needs, make provision for those needs ‘and in doing 
so [they] may take account of their resources.’ 15   As a result of a stroke, Ms 
McDonald suffered from limited mobility and frequency of urination: this contributed 
to her being at risk of falling.16  She needed assistance to access the toilet both during 
the day and the night.  Her request for night –time assistance was rejected by the 
council, and alternative care was eventually put in place, which was the provision of 
incontinence pads for her to use. The use of incontinence pads was viewed as ‘a 
practical and appropriate solution to Ms McDonald’s night –time toileting needs…,’17 
in the context of available resources (and the rejection by Ms McDonald of the other 
care alternatives offered to her). Her needs and also wishes in the context of the care 
plan were considered to be ‘elimination of risk of injury’ and ‘a desire for 
independence and privacy’, both of which could be met with the provision of 
incontinence pads.18  Lord Brown found that there was no interference with Article 8 
ECHR, but stated that even if an interference with the right to family and private life 
                                                        
13  The challenge at the Supreme Court R (McDonald) [2011] UKSC n 5 at Para 5 gave rise to four 
issues for appeal.  These included whether the care plan reviews were a reassessment of needs, whether 
due regard was given to the nature of needs within the requirement of disability legislation, and 
whether Article 8 ECHR had been infringed and whether that interference was lawful.  
14 The relevant statutory provisions which placed duties upon the Royal Borough of Chelsea and 
Kensington in respect of Ms McDonald’s care included the:  National Health Service and Community 
Care Act (2009), S 47; National Assistance Act (1948) S 29(1); Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons 
Act (1947) S 2(1); Local Authority Social Services Act (1970) S 7(1). 
15 R (McDonald) [2011] n 5 at Para 8 
16 Ibid. Para 1. 
17 Ibid. Para 11 referring to the 2010 Care Plan Review for Ms McDonald. 
18 Ibid. Para 12 citing Rix LJ in R (McDonald) (2010) EWCA n 5at Para 53. 
was identified, it could be justified under Article 8(2) ECHR.19   The ECtHR did find 
that there was an interference with Article 8, however save in respect to a violation 
between November 2008 and 2009 (based on procedural aspects), that interference 
was lawful.20 
The ECtHR in the case reaffirms that health and social care interests are justiciable on 
the basis of Article 8 ECHR, including “complaints about public funding to facilitate 
the mobility and quality of life of disabled applicants.”21  The ECtHR also reaffirmed 
its view that Article 8 in principle gives rise to positive obligations, even in the 
context of access to health and social care complaints.22 However it viewed this case 
as giving rise to a negative obligation in respect of the right: that is the issue was not 
one of “a lack of action [as] the state had not refused assistance to Ms McDonald” 
rather it was in relation to a “decision of the local authority to reduce the care package 
that it had hitherto been making available to her”.23    Any interference with Ms 
McDonald’s Article 8 ECHR right, after November 2009, was considered to be lawful 
and proportionate in the context of the legitimate aim of the “economic well-being of 
the state and the interests of other care-users”.24 The state’s decision was viewed in 
the context of a wide margin of appreciation as it involved issues of general policy 
and the Court stated that the “… margin is particularly wide when the issues involve 
an assessment of the priorities in the context of the allocation of limited State 
resources.”25 
                                                        
19 Ibid. per Lord Brown at Para 9.  Lord Walker, Lord Kerr and Lord Dyson all agreed with Lord 
Brown’s judgment and dismissed the appeal.  Lade Hale provided the only dissenting judgment. 
20 McDonald V UK (2014) op cit n1 Para 59. A violation was found for the period 21 November 2008 
to November 2009. Within that time period care was not provided in line with the assessment made.  
No violation was found after November 2009. 
21  Ibid. 
22 Ibid. Para 48. 
23 Ibid. Para 48. 
24 Ibid. Para 53. 
25 Ibid. Para 55 
 While the case provides evidence of the justiciability of access to health and social 
care claims, it also supports the view that the approach to justiciability of economic, 
social and cultural rights of both the UK courts and the ECtHR is limited.  Clough and 
Brazier suggest the case provides an example of the failure of Article 8 ECHR to 
protect the elderly, with its narrow focus on ‘procedural issues’ rather than on the 
“impact of the decisions on the substantive rights or dignity”26  of the individual.  
Clements goes further in his criticism stating that it is concerning that “parts of the 
judiciary do not consider that such distressing circumstances engage fundamental 
human rights at all”.27  Pritchard - Jones suggests that there is as much to learn from 
the case in respect of what is not said, as much as in terms of what is said, with the 
“ECtHR’s disinclination to engage with substantive discussions of dignity and 
autonomy”.28    
 
The criticisms of a focus on procedure, a reluctance to consider ‘normative values’ or 
minimum standards and judicial deference in the context of resource allocation 
questions are part of the wider debate on the extent to which courts should be 
involved in challenges relevant to social justice.29  O Cinniede suggests that even 
though there are times it appears that courts look to some substantive aspects (for 
example non-discrimination and equality) of economic, social and cultural rights, they 
continue to limit the review of these rights by tying these aspects to the process of 
                                                        
26 Clough & Brazier op cit n 4 p141  
27 Clements op cit n 4 p 684.  
28 L Pritchard- Jones ‘Night-time care, article 8 and the European Court of human Rights: A missed 
opportunity’. Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law (2015) (37) 108 p 111 
29 O’Cinneide  op cit n 4 p 395 - 396 
decision-making rather than look to the impact of the decision on the individual.30  
This is an approach which he describes as ‘ethically aimless’. 31   He highlights 
McDonald v UK as an example of this, with the core issues of ‘rationality’ and  
‘dignity’ being relegated to side issues while the court focused on procedural issues.32 
Whilst acknowledging the arguments for limited judicial intervention and the dangers 
of judicial intervention in the context of finite resources O’Cinneide suggests that 
there is a need for the courts to view decisions in the context of social justice.  Lady 
Hale’s approach in the McDonald case also seems to suggest that a standard related to 
the impact on the individual is necessary in the context of access to care decisions 
within finite resources: 
“ As Lord Lloyd put it ‘in every case, simple or complex, the need of the 
individual will be assessed against the standards of civilized society as 
we know them in the United Kingdom’ (p598F).  In the United Kingdom 
we do not oblige people who can control their bodily functions to behave 
as if they cannot do so, unless they themselves find this the more 
convenient course.  We are, I still believe, a civilized society.  I would 
have allowed the appeal”33 
 
If the CESCR General Comment, which elaborates on the meaning of Article 12 
ICESCR in stating ‘[e]very human being is entitled to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of health conducive to living a life in dignity’34  is considered then 
the standard of a civilized society requires that individuals are treated with dignity.  
 
In the original High Court case, the only references made to dignity (indignity) were 
                                                        
30 Ibid. One example of this is found in Eisai Limited v. The National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence (NICE), The Alzheimer's Society, Shire Pharmaceuticals Limited [2007] EWHC 1941 
(Admin) QBD (Admin).  One aspect considered by the court in this case was the discriminatory effect 
within one aspect of the process of evaluation of the treatment.   
31 Ibid.  p403. He identifies ‘ethical aimlessness’ as a term first used by Anthony Lester in association 
with the common law before the ‘modern rule of law’ and human rights.  
32 Ibid. p 403. 
33 McDonald [2011] UKSC op cit n 5 at Para 79 citing R v Gloucestershire County Council ex parte 
Barry [1997] AC 584 at 589F. 
34 CESCR General Comment No 14: The Right to Health (Article 12). (11 August 2000). 
E/C.12/2000/4.Para 1. 
by the applicant in her claim that the withdrawal of night-time care exposed her to 
‘risk and indignity.’35   In the Court of Appeal the applicant’s lawyers continued to 
view the withdrawal of care as an ‘affront to her dignity,’36 argued that dignity was at 
the heart of Article 8 ECHR37 and the impact upon ‘Ms McDonald’s core right of 
dignity’ was not proportionate to the aim of ‘equitable allocation of resources’ or to 
the aim of saving money in the decision on what care to provide.38  In contrast the 
council viewed the provision of incontinence sheets as a way to protect dignity and 
privacy, supporting this argument by highlighting the experience of others: that is 
‘most people were willing to accept them’ and were happy with this form of care.39 
As such within the High Court and Court of Appeal no issue of dignity was associated 
with the nature of the care.   In the context of the earlier care plan and failing to meet 
the needs of Ms Mc Donald, which could allow for a finding of a violation of Article 
8 ECHR, the courts suggested that this “was not born out of any disrespect” for the 
applicants dignity but out of a concern for the council’s “responsibilities to all its 
clients within the limited resources available to it within its budget”.40 
 
Within the Supreme Court Judgment Lord Brown provided some insight as to why he 
considered there was no disrespect for the dignity of the applicant: his view was that 
the council had “sought to respect as far as possible her personal feelings and desires, 
at the same time taking account of her safety, her independence and their own 
responsibilities towards all their other clients.”41  Evidence of this included offering 
                                                        
35 Ibid. Para 1 and 4  
36 McDonald (2010) EWCA op cit n 5 Para 2 
37 Ibid. Para 63 
38 Ibid. Para 70 
39 Ibid. Para 24, 26 &27.  The evidence appears to be anecdotal and not based on any formal 
evaluation. 
40 Ibid. Para 66 
41 Mc Donald [2011] UKSC op cit n 5 Para 19 
alternative choices and aspects of support such as direct payments. In essence he 
viewed autonomy as being closely associated with dignity. The decision to provide 
‘incontinence sheets’ was also considered to be an ‘acceptable practice’: this seems to 
suggest that if dignity was relevant in the case evidence of ‘acceptable practice’ was a 
sufficient measure of it being met.  Lady Hale was critical of this approach, 
highlighting that no evidence had been submitted to support this acceptable practice: 
in fact she suggested that evidence would tend to disagree with that approach.42   The 
range of literature and guidance on caring for individuals who suffer with 
incontinence would suggest that dignity is a key aspect in their care.43 Although the 
applicant was continent, she was being treated as if she was not and as such it would 
seem that the guidance on incontinence care could be a starting point in evaluating the 
care.   The difference between ‘accepted practice’ and ‘expected practice’ in health 
care is one which has been discussed in the context of negligence by Samanta.44  
Within the ECtHR there is also limited reference to the concept of dignity. Although 
the Court concurred with Lady Hale and stated that dignity was engaged in this case 
as the applicant “was faced with the possibility of living in a manner which 
‘conflicted with her strongly held ideas of self and personal identity.”45  The Court 
associated the concept of dignity with the feelings of the applicant and not with any 
moral standard of conduct associated with the approach of the state.  The Court went 
                                                        
42 Ibid. Para 75 Lady Hales states ‘Such Department of Health Guidance as there is, points the other 
way.’ Although no Lady Hale does not identify the specific guidance, see  Para  31 where Lord Walker 
identifies a Department of Health Document (2000) in support of the proposition that incontinence 
sheets could be provided:  it stated ‘incontinence sheets should not be offered prematurely.” 
43 See for example Centre for Health Service Studies University of Kent & Royal College of Physicians 
(2009) Privacy and Dignity in Continence Care Project  (2009) accessed at 
https://kar.kent.ac.uk/24800/1/Phase_1_Privacy_and_Dignity_in_Continence_Care_Report_November
_2009.pdf (20/5/2015) 
44 A Samanta & S Samanta ‘Legal Standard of Care: A shift from the Traditional Bolam Test’ Clinical 
Medicine  (2003)3(5): 443 – 446.    
45 McDonald v UK  [2014] op cit  n 1 Para 47 citing Pretty v United Kingdom 2346/02 (2002) 35 
EHRR 1 
on to conclude that the ‘applicant’s personal feelings and desires had properly been 
balanced against the local authority’s concern for her safety, and independence and 
respect for other care users.’46  As such dignity appears to be viewed as an interest of 
no greater value than safety or independence. 
Throughout the McDonald litigation the focus was on procedural aspects of decision 
making within finite resources, including a broad definition of needs as safety and 
privacy, with the standard of care being assessed as ‘acceptable practice’.   Ms Mc 
Donald’s feeling of humiliation was acknowledged but the view appeared to be that 
her negative feeling towards the care would be temporary, as ‘acceptable practice’ 
suggested this feeling would change once she had tried the incontinence sheets.  
Dignity was also associated with the efforts to involve the applicant in the decision 
making process.   Rather than being viewed as a core value to which the courts should 
look it was viewed as an interest or right in the same way as autonomy and safety, and 
as such it seems it could be limited for the wider good in the context of finite 
resources.   Lady Hale in her dissent does look to care standards in the context of a 
hospital or care home setting to identify whether the approach is acceptable, although 
she acknowledges that the same care is not possible in a community setting as it 
would be in a hospital setting.47  The approach to both justiciability and dignity in the 
case is limited.   It leaves questions as to what dignity ought to mean, as well as 
questions as to the approach that should be taken in law to dignity. 
 
                                                        
46 Ibid. Para 56 
47 Ibid. Para 78  “The Care Quality Commission's Guidance, Essential Standards of Quality and Safety 
(2010), p 117 requires that people who use services have access to toilets, baths and showers that 
enable them to maintain privacy and dignity and are in close proximity to their living areas. The 
Commission's recent Review of Compliance at Ipswich Hospital NHS Trust found that dignity was not 
always sufficiently considered because people were not taken to a toilet away from their bed-space and 
commodes were used all the time: p 8.”   
Dignity:  What does it mean?  
Foster, although describing the concept of dignity as a ‘slippery one,’ argues that it is 
an important and useful concept, despite the criticism of it being vague.48 In recent 
years the debate on the meaning of dignity has increased both in the context of law, 
and health care.49 Often understanding of that concept begins with reference to end of 
life choices and palliative care.  For example Jacobsen highlights that in bioethics, 
debates on dignity were embedded in the controversies of aspects related to care of 
the dying.50   In law, Foster highlights that courts tended to look to the concept in 
‘hard cases’, and argues that if the concept is applicable in such  cases it can also have 
a wider relevance.51 Foster views dignity ‘as the transaction that constitutes the whole 
bioethical encounter.’52   It is an approach which acknowledges that the concept arises 
in the interaction between individuals and groups: That is the individual is ‘seen’ as a 
person by those they are interacting with.53   
 
The ‘transaction’ approach taken by Foster is appealing in that it allows for the 
recognition of both subjective and objective aspects to the concept of dignity.  The 
subjective aspect can be described in terms of the impact on the individual including 
feelings of humiliation, invisibility or exclusion, while the objective aspects can be 
viewed in the conduct towards to the individual and the standard of conduct expected 
by society to all individuals. The subjective aspect of dignity appears to equate to 
what in health has been described as ‘personal or basic dignity’ and in law as dignity 
                                                        
48 Foster op cit  n 7 p 4 
49 Ibid. Chapter 5 – 7. 
50 See Jacobsen op cit n 8 p297 – 299. 
51 Foster op cit n 7 p 3 
52 Ibid. p 15  
53 S Pleschburger S ‘Dignity and Dying in Nursing Homes: The Residents’ Views’ Age and Dying 
(2007) (36) 2 197 -202. 
as ‘quality’.54   When an individual is treated without dignity, the term ‘objectify’ has 
been used to describe the approach to their care: that is the patient is not seen as an 
individual and is lost in the process of tasks and budgets.55  That focus on elements of 
care rather looking to the individual has been one of the criticisms made in respect to 
the separation of social and health care, leading to calls for greater multi-disciplinary 
approaches to ensure the holistic needs of the individual are recognized and met.56 
The recognition of such an integrated person-centred approach has also been called 
for at the governance level.57   Given this, it is interesting that limited references to 
health have been made in the Mc Donald case,58 with no real consideration of the long 
term impact on maintaining and improving ‘functional capacities’ such as 
continence.59 
 
The objective aspect of dignity appears to equate to a ‘moral standard’ or what in law 
has been described as a ‘status’ concept:  In other words it appears to be associated 
with the value placed upon the individual by society.60 As such it is unsurprising that 
dignity in law is closely associated with concepts of equality whether generally or in 
                                                        
54 See Foster op cit n 7; Jacobsen op cit n 8 
55 Band-Winterstein T. ‘Health Care Provision for Older Persons: Ageism and Elder Neglect’ Journal 
of Applied Gerontology (2013) 1-15. 
56 Department of Health (January 2014) ‘ The Hard Truth: The Journey to Putting People First. Volume 
One of the Government Response to the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry’ Cm 
8777- accessed at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270368/34658_Cm_877
7_Vol_1_accessible.pdf  (2/6/2015) Para 5.20 
57 Newdick C. ‘From Hippocrates to Commodities: Three Models of NHS Governance’ Medical Law 
Review (2014) 22(4) 162- 184 
58 McDonald v UK (2014) op cit n1 Para 30 – 34. The relevant international law referred to was the UN 
Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities and the European Union Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (although the relevance of this is unclear given the Charter is only binding against the 
Institutions of the Union). 
59 See General Comment 14 op cit n 34 Discussed further in the context of the International Right to 
Health.  Although a referral was offered in relation to incontinence care for Mrs Mc Donald, this was 
refused as she was continent.  However now consideration of how encouraging someone to be 
incontinent at night would impact on maintenance of long term functional capacity (continence).l 
60 M Oosterveld-Vlug, H Pasman, I van Gennip, C de Vet & B Onwuteaka-Philipsen. ‘Assessing the 
Validity and Intra-Observer Agreement of the MIDAM-LTC; an Instrument Measuring Factors that 
Influence Personal Dignity in Long-Term Care Facilities’ Quality of Life and Health Outcomes (2014) 
12(17) doi:10.1186/1477-7525-12-17. 
the context of human rights law.  This approach of categorizing dignity into two 
major categories is supported by qualitative research in health care.61 
 
In spite of the difficulties in defining dignity, there have been attempts by the 
professional regulatory bodies and unions for health and social care practitioners to 
define the concept.  The more detailed attempts Foster suggests are found in the 
context of nursing.62 Although he highlights all the definitions are subject to criticism. 
The need for these professions to explain the concept is telling as to the importance 
they place on the value in health and social care.63  As such there is a growing body of 
health care research which seeks to understand what dignity means from the 
perspective of those receiving care, those providing care, how dignity should be 
measured and the factors influencing subjective and objective concepts of dignity.64 
One study, albeit based upon a small sample suggests patients recognise that quality 
of life and dignity are not synonymous concepts, although the likelihood of violations 
of dignity does increase for those requiring support from others, such as those living 
in care homes.65  This emphasizes that when there is some aspect of dependence, the 
potential for dignity to be infringed increases. 66   The studies, much as Foster’s 
theoretical examples in relation to dignity, highlight that dignity is not solely about 
autonomy or independence, or about the way we are made to feel but also about how 
the individual is treated: that treatment provides an indication of how society views 
                                                        
61 See Foster op cit  n 7 p 75 citing the findings of Pleschburger  op cit n53  
62  Ibid.  Chapter 5. 
63 Ibid. 
64  See for example Pleschburger op cit n 53; Royal College of Nursing Defending Dignity. Challenges 
and Opportunities for Nursing (2008) Royal College of Nursing accessed at 
http://www.rcn.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/166655/003257.pdf   (20/5/2015). 
Cairns et al op cit  n 10; Oosterveld et al op cit n 59 
65 Oosterveld et al  op cit  n 60 p 26 
66 Ibid. Also see Pleschburger  op cit  n 53 
that individual.67  The studies in their attempts to identify factors which ‘maintain or 
retain dignity’ give rise to a common theme of dignity as an ‘evaluation of oneself in 
close relation to others.’68  Arguably this still leaves a sense of vagueness associated 
with the concept, which requires greater clarification in the context of law.  
The concept of dignity in law has traditionally been considered in challenges related 
to ‘end of life’ decisions;69 individual integrity and autonomy;70 equality71 and human 
rights.72   There is also a need to consider that concept in the context of health and 
social care law, and in particular in respect to access to treatment cases.  As with 
understanding of dignity in health, understanding of the concept in law seems to be 
have been discussed to a large extent within end of life contexts, the cases Foster 
describes as ‘hard cases’.   In the context of the McDonald case, the ECtHR referred 
to Pretty v UK73 to discuss one aspect of dignity, which is ‘self-identity’ and the right 
to choose.  Other aspects the Courts have recognized include ‘physical integrity’ and 
equality.74 Mc Crudden suggests that there are three aspects to the ‘minimum core’ of 
dignity in human rights law which includes: (1) ‘the intrinsic worth of the human 
being,’ (2) respect for the intrinsic worth of the human being and (3) “…the state 
should be seen to exist for the sake of the individual human being, and not vice versa 
(the limited-state claim)”. 75   He goes on to consider the nature of dignity, and 
questions whether it is a right, which can be enforced or a principle from which rights 
                                                        
67 Foster op cit n 7 chapter 1 provides hypothetical examples to highlight this point.  
68 Oosterveld op cit  n 59 p 26 
69 See for example Airedale N.H.S. Trust v Bland [1993] A.C. 789; Pretty v. United Kingdom  (2002) 
op cit n 45  
70 See for example Tyrer v United Kingdom [1978] ECHR 2;  Pretty v. United Kingdom  (2002)  op cit 
n 45 
71 See the articles by Moon op cit n 11in respect of Canadian law and O’Connell op cit n 11in respect 
to the European Convention on Human Rights.  
72 See McCrudden op cit n 11 who reviews the approach to dignity in Human Rights law.  
73 Pretty v. United Kingdom op cit  n 44 
74 McCrudden op cit  n 11 p 723 
75 Ibid. p 679 
can be derived and which underpins judicial interpretation.76   He suggests dignity is 
viewed as ‘underpinning’ rights. 77 This would suggest that it is a value within the law 
of this jurisdiction. This was the perspective put forward by Lord Justice Munby in 
Burke v General Medical Council78 when he said dignity 
“is a core value of the common law, long pre- dating the Convention…the 
invocation of dignity of the patient in the form of declaration habitually 
used when the court is exercising its inherent declaratory jurisdiction in 
relation to the gravely ill or dying is not some meaningless incantation…it is 
a solemn affirmation of the law’s and society’s recognition of our humanity 
and of human dignity as something fundamental.”79 
 
Although the Court of Appeal was critical of Lord Justice Munby in this case his 
comments on dignity were ‘not disapproved’.80  One criticism of the approach of 
Munby J in the Burke case by Foster is his view that autonomy and dignity have 
equivalence in law.  Foster suggests that ‘dignity is a deeper concept than 
autonomy,’81 although he describes both concepts as rights he describes ‘dignity as 
the parent right’. 82    Arguably dignity is more than a right (if Mc Crudden’s 
description of the minimum core is considered), it is a value which underpins rights, 
and is the standard by which rights implementation is assessed.   It should not be 
subject to limitation in the way that autonomy would be when assessed against other 
rights.   Yet despite dignity being the ‘parent right’, in the McDonald litigation it is 
trumped by safety in the context of finite resources.  Contrast this with the approach 
of the ECtHR in respect of autonomy and safety in deprivation of liberty challenges 
and the requirement for safeguards.83   An approach where dignity is balanced against 
                                                        
76 Ibid. p 680 &681 
77 Ibid. p 683 citing  Pretty v. United Kingdom op cit  n 45 
78 R(On the Application of Burke)  v General Medical Council [2005] QB 424  
79 Ibid. Para 57 
80 Foster op cit  n 7p 101 
81 Ibid. p 110, he goes on to say that autonomy is a manifestation of dignity. 
82 Ibid. 
83 HL v UK 45508/99 (2004)ECHR 471 
interests or rights such as autonomy or safety contradicts the description of it as being 
fundamental, or as being a value which underpins rights. 
 
If dignity is a value within the context of human rights and equality law it ought to be 
the context in which rights protection is considered (whether that is described as the 
‘standard of a civilized society’, the ‘expected practice’ or a ‘measure of 
humanity’).84   Such a standard would have imposed a positive obligation upon the 
council in McDonald v UK to ensure that care met that standard.  It would have 
required the Court to question how the needs of the individual were to be met, in a 
way that was consistent with dignity.  To date as Foster has highlighted the adoption 
and development of dignity as a standard, or what he has called a ‘lodestone’ has not 
been taken up by the Courts. 
 
Fabre also suggests dignity can contribute to ‘…a common metric by which to judge 
the relative importance of conflicting interests.’ 85   That common metric can be 
described in terms of a ‘minimal decent life’ and equality.86  In the context of health 
care as previously argued in this chapter, there is empirical evidence to suggest that 
‘expected practice’, with reference to dignity can be defined.  In the particular facts of 
the McDonald case it would require looking to the NHS values, professional codes of 
conduct and the existing research in relation to incontinence (for the outcome in this 
case would have similar implications for the applicant as for those who are 
                                                        
84 Burke v General Medical Council [2005] op cit n 78 Para 71  also citing at Para 72  Baroness Hale  
What can the Human Rights Act Do from My Mental Health  (2004)  Paul Sieghart Memorial lecture  
p 22 ; See also op cit n 33, n44, n79 
85 C Fabre ‘Social Rights under the Constitution: Government and Decent Life’ (2000) Oxford 
University Press: Oxford. p2.  
86 S Fredman . ‘From Deference to Democracy: The Role of Equality under the Human Rights Act 
1998’ Law Quarterly Review (2006) 53 at p 60; Also see Moon op cit n 11; Moon & Allen op cit n 11. 
incontinent) and the approach to dignity and health in those standards.87    Foster 
highlights the relevance of Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee88 and 
the requirement in negligence cases of a practice being ‘endorsed by a responsible 
body of opinion in the relevant specialty’ as a useful approach to look at standards of 
care: an approach which Samanta suggests involves looking to ‘expected’ and not 
‘accepted practice’.89  Also a right to health approach requires that care should be 
based upon need, and that the care is ‘scientifically and medically appropriate’.90 
 
Réaume suggests a failure to respect human dignity is associated with ‘prejudice, 
stereotyping and exclusion from benefits or opportunities.’ 91    Given the 
acknowledgment that ageism exists in health care provision it is unsurprising that 
failure to respect dignity is a recurring theme in reports and inquiries on health care 
provision involving older people.92   It ultimately comes back to the value society 
places on the individual: 
“the more important a particular benefit is to one's ability to participate 
fully in society, or the more it is a marker of true belonging in society, the 
more one should worry that exclusion from it will carry the connotation 
that members of the excluded group deserve less respect.”93 
 
                                                        
87 In particular see the Centre for Health Service Studies University of Kent & Royal College of 
Physicians op cit n 43. 
88 [1957] 1 WLR 583;   Also see Samanta & Samanta op cit  n 44 who discuss the impact  of Bolitho v 
City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232 on Bolam. 
89 Foster op cit n 7 p 7 
90 General Comment 14 op cit  n 34 Para 12 (d)  
91 Moon op cit n 11 p 705. citing D Réaume ‘Discrimination and Dignity’ (2003) 63 Louisiana Law 
Review p 672 
92  See J Harris. & S Regmi. ‘Ageism and Equality’ Journal of Medical Ethics (2012) 38(5): 263 – 266; 
Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman ‘Care and Compassion? Report of Health Service 
Ombudsman on Ten Investigations into NHS Care of Older People’ (2011) accessed at 
http://www.ombudsman.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/7216/Care-and-Compassion-PHSO-
0114web.pdf (28/05/2015). See also  Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission ‘Emergency Health 
Care’ (2015) accessed at 
http://www.nihrc.org/uploads/publications/NIHRC_Emergency_Healthcare_Report.pdf (3/05/2015) 
93 Moon op cit n 11 citing D Réaume op cit n 91 p695. 
Strikingly in contrast to a developing advocacy and a large body of evidence of 
ageism on the rights of older people there is a limited body of case law relating to 
older people and health and health care.94  The reaction in the context of health care to 
the evidence of ageism and the issue of dignity has been an upsurge in research on the 
meaning of dignity in health and social care, as well as campaigns to ensure respect 
for individual dignity.  This would suggest that in litigation on health and social care 
access, the courts ought to give more consideration to this normative legal value.  A 
starting point in developing the approach to dignity in this particular context could be 
the international right to health.  
 
 
Dignity and the International Right to Health. 
The argument that Article 12 ICESCR is an important starting point in developing 
understanding of dignity is made despite the view of the UK that the Covenant does 
not give rise to justiciable rights, only principles that guide policy.95  The UK state 
reports to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the 
Treaty monitoring body the ICESCR, suggests that policy and action on health 
(including for older people) is compliant with right to health requirements.96  As such 
there is an acknowledgement by the UK of the right to health irrespective of their 
view of the right as a non-justiciable.97  Whether the right is viewed as a set of 
                                                        
94 Rodriquez- Pinzon  D & Martin C ‘The International Human Rights Status of Elderly Person’ 
American University International Law Review  (2003) (18) 4 915-1008. 
95 United Kingdom 5th Periodic Report on Implementation of the International United Nations 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (31 January 2008) E/C.12/GBR/5 Para 51 & 74. 
96 Ibid. Para 296 – 325. 
97  Department of Health NHS Constitution for England  (2013) accessed at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/170656/NHS_Constituti
on.pdf  (19/5/2015 ). Although the term  right to health is not specifically used in the Constitution 
many of the rights associated with a right to health are identifiable such as non-discrimination; Also   
See Department of Health ,Social Services and Public Safety for Northern Ireland (June 2014)  Making 
Life Better: A Whole System Strategic Framework for Public Health 2013 – 2023 accessed at 
principles to guide policy or as a justiciable right the starting point to understanding it 
is General Comment 14 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.98 
General Comment 14 describes the right as a right to the freedoms and entitlements, 
which are necessary in order that an individual can attain ‘the highest attainable 
standard of health conducive to a life in dignity’, which is possible for them.99    Two 
important caveats exist in relation to this standard; (1) there are aspects beyond the 
control of the state in respect to what health can be achieved by an individual100 and 
(2) the individual right to the freedoms and entitlements, which are within the control 
of the state, can be lawfully limited. Lawful limitation of the right is allowed on the 
same grounds as civil and political rights, and in addition state discretion is afforded 
in implementation of the right within the context of available resources and the point 
from which progress in implementation of the right to health starts. 101  Two 
overlapping approaches have been developed to explain the obligations imposed upon 
the state which are subject to limitation, both can be identified in General Comment 
14.102  
 
The first of the frameworks to explain state obligations revolves around a traditional 
obligations approach to human rights and is associated with civil and political rights 
as much as economic, social and cultural rights.  That framework is the tri-partite 
                                                                                                                                                              
http://www.dhsspsni.gov.uk/mlb-strategic-framework-2013-2023.pdf  (18/5/2015) at p 8 in which the 
‘right to the highest attainable standard of health’ is acknowledged as an underpinning value of the 
strategy. 
98 General Comment 14 op cit n 34 
99 Ibid. Para 1 The definition in Article 12(1) is developed with reference to dignity. 
100 Ibid. Para 8 & 9 
101 Ibid.  Para 31.  
102Ibid. Para 34 – 37;  Also see United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical 
and Mental Health, Paul Hunt (11 February 2005) E/CN.4/2005/51 who discusses these frameworks at 
Para 46 – 50;  
obligations of respect protect and fulfill.103 The second framework has been described 
as a useful tool to examine state policy,104 and involves viewing state conduct in the 
context of questioning what should be made available and who has access. The 
literature also speaks of acceptability and quality, and sometimes affordability in 
relation to entitlements. However this chapter focuses on availability and 
accessibility, viewing the facets of acceptability, affordability and quality as aspects 
of that broader categorization.  The overlap of these characteristics with the concepts 
of availability and accessibility can be seen in the context of the McDonald case. The 
care she wanted, the provision of carers to assist her in accessing toilet facilities 
during the night was not provided instead an alternate care package was provided, 
which was the supply of ‘incontinence sheets’.   The state view and indeed, the 
ECtHR view was that acceptable care was provided within available resources: the 
alternate view would be that there was no access to the necessary care, given that the 
care plan gave rise to questions of acceptability on the part of Ms McDonald.  In 
assessing the right of access to care, including the quality of care, the court looked to 
affordability, and viewed the acceptability of the care from the perspective of the care 
provider only.105   
 
The framework of availability and accessibility allows questions to be asked on how 
decisions are made as well as in respect to the impact of those decisions.  General 
Comment 14 provides guidance on what should be considered in looking at those 
decisions.  Procedural aspects to be considered include that decisions are based on 
scientific evidence and assessed needs, while the impact of those decisions is 
                                                        
103  See M Sepulveda  M ‘The Nature of the obligations under the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’  School of Human Rights Research Series 18 (2003) Intersentia: 
Antwerp for an overview of the development of the recognition of these obligations. 
104  Hunt op cit  n 102 Para 46   
105  Op cit n 42 
considered in the context of whether they are discriminatory, provide for equality of 
opportunity and are ‘conducive to a life in dignity’. The scope of what should be 
made available (freedoms and entitlements) can be considered with reference to 
Article 12(2), which outlines broad programmatic areas of the right to health. 
However given the breadth of the programmatic area, and the acknowledgement in 
General Comment 14 of the broad definition of health the scope of the right is 
arguably determined by the impact on health.  The focus of this chapter is dignity and 
the subsequent question is how is dignity associated with state obligations in respect 
of the right to health.  
 
Three references are made to the concept of dignity in the main text of General 
Comment 14.106  The right is described as the right to ‘the highest attainable standard 
of health conducive to living a life in dignity’107 suggesting that dignity is part of the 
definition of the right as well as a standard to be met. It also seems to be a pre-
requisite for realisation of the right, when the right to health is described as being 
dependent upon other human rights ‘as contained in the International Bill of Rights’, 
one of which is stated as ‘human dignity’.108  The third reference to dignity is found in 
the context of care for older people.  The concept is associated with care which should 
‘maintain the functional capacities’ of older people through preventive care as well as 
curative care. 109  It is not clear given the formulation of the statement if this is a 
general principle to be applied in respect of the right to health or is associated with the 
care of the terminally ill only. The rationale for an approach, which focuses on 
supporting the ‘maintenance of functional capacities’ appears to be associated with 
                                                        
106 General comment 14 op cit n 34 Para 1, 3 and 25.  A further reference is made in footnote 13 of the 
General Comment in respect to ‘healthy, natural and workplace environments’.  
107 Ibid. Para 1. 
108 Ibid. Para 3.   
109 Ibid. Para 25 
resources: the argument made is that over a longer time care will be less resource 
intensive. 110  Reference is also made to General Comment 6 on the economic, social 
and cultural rights of older persons, which in turn emphasizes the importance of the 
United Nations Principles on Older Persons111 and which states 
“older persons should be able to live in dignity and security and be free of 
exploitation and physical or mental abuse, should be treated fairly, 
regardless of age, gender, racial or ethnic background, disability, financial 
situation or any other status, and be valued independently of their economic 
contribution”112 
 
General Comment 14 seems to suggest that dignity ought to be part of any rights 
approach, including a right to health approach.  However, given the limited references 
to the concept it is difficult to identify what exactly that means within any right to 
health approach.   One aspect is that dignity appears to be a part of the definition of a 
right to health (‘the highest attainable standard of health conducive to living a life in 
dignity’).113   A second aspect raised in respect of older persons is that ‘functional 
capacities’ should be supported, although in the context it is discussed it appears to be 
about supporting and maintaining independence.   The final three aspects to the 
concept in General Comment 14, are it is suggested, more in keeping with the 
traditional perspectives of dignity in law: (1) dignity as associated with individual 
integrity (freedom from inhumane and degrading treatment and torture),114 (2) dignity 
                                                        
110 Ibid.  Also see CESCR General Day of Discussion on the Rights of the Ageing and Elderly in 
Respect to Rights recognized in the Covenant, 20 December 1993, E/C.12/1993/SR.12.  The concept of 
dignity was mentioned in the context of independence and involvement with the community. 
111 United Nations Principles for Older Persons, 16 December 1991, General Assembly resolution 
46/91. 
112 Ibid. Article 17 cited in CESCR General Comment No 6: The Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
of Older Persons. (8 December 1995) Contained in  E/1996/22. Para 5  
113 Ibid. Para 1. 
114 General comment 14 op cit n 34. 
as associated with non-discrimination and equality law115 and (3) dignity as associated 
with care for the terminally ill.116    
 
The concluding observations of the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights, responsible for monitoring the implementation of the ICESCR, appear to offer 
limited further guidance on the meaning of dignity in the context of the right to 
health.  A review of the concluding observations in 2014 and a search within the 
Bayefsky database of concluding observations until 2005 highlight few references to 
the term ‘dignity’ in association with health. 117   As with General Comment 14, when 
dignity is explicitly used, it is referred to as a standard which legislation should be 
consistent with.118  One factor of that standard is found in the concept of ‘inhumane 
conditions’,119 although this linkage of dignity to inhuman conditions is found in a 
discussion report, between the Committee and the State in respect of the State report 
and not the concluding observations. 120  In the discussion report concerns in respect 
of state run nursing homes were acknowledged by the state representative, including 
that care ‘quality was poor, and many, instead of providing active nursing care, 
                                                        
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. Para 25  
117 In a review of the 2014 Concluding Observations of the CESCR there are only two references to the 
concept of dignity. CESCR Concluding Observations regarding El Salvador (19 June 2014). 
E/C.12/SLV/CO/3-5 Para 22 CESCR; CESCR Concluding Observations regarding China, including 
Hong Kong, China and Macao (13 June 2014) E/c.12/CHN/CO/2  Para 30 (the issue forced evictions 
in the context of city renewal and the state is urged to ensure  ‘…free, prior and informed consent and 
with full respect for their safety and dignity.’  A thematic search of the Bayefsky.com site also 
highlights limited references to the concept, with only 6 references made to the concept up until 2001 
and 3 references  from 2001 – 2005.  
118 Ibid. Concluding Observations regarding El Salvador  at Para 22 “The Committee urges the State 
party to revise its legislation on the total prohibition of abortion to make it compatible with other 
fundamental rights such as the woman’s right to health and life, and consistent with the dignity of 
women’   
119 CESCR Concluding Observations regarding Germany (24 September, 2001) E/C.12/1/Add/68 Para 
24 and 42.  The observations refer to a grave concern about ‘inhumane conditions’ in nursing homes 
for older people.  
120   Economic and Social Council Summary Record of the 49th Meeting Regarding Germany. (30 
August 2001).E/C.12/2001/SR.49. Para 67 ( a statement by the Mr Willers,  a representative of the 
State) 
resorted to passive treatment in the form of sedation, with a resulting high incidence 
of incontinence, malnutrition and dehydration.”121   It was an acknowledgment of the 
requirement for change particularly when the state believed that “living standards 
were governed by a series of laws and that the aim of social welfare was to enhance 
human dignity”.122  However in the concluding observations it was the concerns in 
respect of conditions that were raised, with no mention of dignity.  
 
In 2011 the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health provided a ‘thematic report’ on 
the right to health of older people which expands on some aspects of dignity.123 In 
that report there are eight references to the term ‘dignity’ in the context of older 
people which includes the perception of dignity as (1) part of a right to health 
approach,124 (2) as an aim or standard for care in life125 and in terminal illness,126 (3) 
related to the security or integrity of the individual 127  and (4) as an aspect of 
autonomy.  In relation to autonomy two references are interesting and include as per 
General Comment 14 the need to maintain the functional capacities of older people,128 
(although again this is a very broad concept and in this instance appears to relate to 
contribution to society as much as physical capacity) and secondly the Special 
Rapporteur makes mention of ‘the impact of institutionalization on the autonomy of 
                                                        
121Ibid. 
122 Ibid. Para 68 ( a statement by Ms Kuck-Schneelmelcher,  a representative of the State).  Despite this 
the issue was raised again in the CESCR Concluding Observations regarding Germany (12 July 2011) 
E/C.12/DEU/CO/5. Para 27  where the CESCR observed that the state had not taken sufficient 
measures to deal with the difficulties  in state nursing homes.      
123 Grover A.  Thematic Study on the Realization of the Right to Health of Older Persons by the Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical 
and Mental Health, Arnand Grover. (4 July 2011) A/HRC/18/37. 
124 Ibid. Para  10  
125 Ibid. Para 11 Para 11  
126 Ibid. Paras 21,  54, 59 & 60 par 54,  
127 Ibid. Para 61 
128 Ibid. Para 21  
older persons and its often harmful effect on their dignity.”129   A further aspect of 
infringement of dignity was also highlighted which is the linkage to ‘humiliation’ in 
the statement “[l]oss of full independence, restricted freedom of movement and lack 
of access to basic functions would cause feelings of deep frustration and humiliation 
to any individual. Older persons are no exception to this.”130   The last comment has 
particular resonance in the McDonald litigation. A further comment by the Special 
Rapporteur on dignity, which is worth stating in full, is that “older persons must be 
treated with as much dignity during the process of dying as they should have been in 
the early phases of their life course.”131  The statement highlights the development of 
the concept in approaches to end of life care. Although dignity seems to be 
acknowledged as a standard within the right to health, there is a need to develop 
understanding of that concept further not only in relation to care of the dying but also 
in respect of all aspects of care to enable a standard of health which is conducive to 
living a life in dignity.  
 
The centrality of the concept of dignity to the right to health is reflected in a recent 
‘right to health assessment’ of emergency health care by the Northern Ireland Human 
Rights Commission.132  Within the report the concept of dignity is frequently referred 
to, and is equated with a ‘person-centred approach’ to care133 although the report 
suggests there is more to do to understand dignity when it states  
“There are, however, a number of gaps in the referencing of human 
rights in domestic law. The operational meaning of “dignity” is often 
lacking within both the Quality Standards and the PCE Standards. It 
is therefore difficult to ascertain how “dignity,” including dignity in 
                                                        
129 Ibid. Para 49 & 61 where dignity and autonomy are also associated together. 
130  Ibid. Para 49  
131  A Grover op cit  n 123 Para 60 
132 Op Cit  n 92 
133 Ibid  p 17.  Within the report dignity was referred to 107 times.  The inquiry found no systemic 
evidence of violations. 
death, can be put into effect, especially in the challenging 
environment of an [emergency department]”134 
 
The research to develop the operationalization of the concept already exists if 
reference is made to existing case law and empirical research on health care practice, 
(although it is accepted that more needs to be done on this):  Both research and case 
law can contribute to the understanding of dignity within ‘a right to health' approach 
to health and social care. 
 
Dignity: A Normative Value in Access to Health Litigation? 
If “…policies in respect of the elderly reflect the ethical principles of society”135 then 
there is a need to question what ethical principles have relevance in decisions on 
access to health and social care for the elderly. The evidence that would suggest that 
dignity ought to be a central value which requires greater consideration includes: (1) it 
is a recurring theme where failures of care have been identified, (2) there is a growing 
body of literature and empirical work on the concept of dignity in health and law 
which courts can look to, to question the application of dignity in the context of 
particular legal questions and (3) dignity is a central value which informs human 
rights protection.  If the approach to access to health and social care litigation was to 
be considered in the context of a right to health approach then a fourth reason can be 
identified and that is, it is part of the core standard of the right.   The central argument 
against using dignity as a standard lies in the criticism that it remains a vague and 
unclear concept, a criticism which is less true today. In recent years there has been an 
increase in empirical research on the concept, which provides some guidance as to 
what dignity means in health and social care practice (and in the context of particular 
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135 General Day of Discussion on the Rights of the Ageing and Elderly (1993) op cit  n 110 Para 29 
types of care), which can contribute to the development of dignity as a norm within 
the current narrow approach to justiciability of access to care challenges.   This 
research provides guidance on how dignity is perceived and maintained in care 
settings.   A consideration of empirical evidence as to what dignity means in 
continence care, including the requirement to ‘maintain functional capacities’ ought to 
have been a relevant discussion in McDonald litigation.  However if dignity is to 
become a meaningful standard in access to health care litigation and provide what O’ 
Cinneide describes as a ‘normative steer’136  in a way that would not create ‘judicial 
overreach’ 137 then greater consideration needs to be given to its meaning and 
application both within the international right to health jurisprudence and in the 
approach of the ECtHR and the domestic courts.   
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